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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
The IMP J spacecraft was launched from Complex 17B of the Eastern
Test Range at 22Z6 EDT on 25 October 1973 (0226, 26 October, GMT). Upon
successful launch, IMP J was designated Explorer 50.
The IMP J Summary Technical Report is published by EMR-Aerospace
Sciences to provide technical and administrative guidance for design, fabri-
cation, integration, testing, and prelaunch activity on future spacecraft
programs. General problems encountered on the IMP J program are des-
cribed, and a recommendation is offered for these problems on future programs.
This report addresses technical problems encountered during the IMP J
program which could recur on future programs; it is not the intent of the report
to criticize program administrative policy or program "philosophy".
Each of the pertinent problems which occurred during the IMP J program
is generally described in this report. This description is followed by a sum-
mary conclusion as to the nature of the problem including a statement of the
conditions which caused the problem to occur. In each case, a recommenda-
tion is given for avoiding similar problems on future spacecraft programs.
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SECTION II
DESIGN PROBLEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following design problems were encountered and are noted here
because they are potential problem areas on future spacecraft.
2-1. ELECTRICAL CONNECTOR MISMATING
The IMP J spacecraft had approximately 100 electrical connectors.
A few locations existed where a connector could be incorrectly mated. One
location concerns the Turn-On Plug which is physically, but not electrically,
interchangeable with the EED Arming Plug. Another location concerns the
two pyrogen connectors which appear the same as the connector for the kick
motor pressure transducer.
2-1- 1. Conclusion
Physical mating of connectors at incorrect locations can cause damage
to the spacecraft or personnel.
2-1-2. Recommendation
Optimally, non-fixed connectors should be unique physically. This
may not always be possible. However, this type problem should be recognized
early. Then the appropriate color coding could be used to minimize incorrect
connector mating. Frequently, equipment designs are complete before this
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type problem can be recognized. Thus, the color coding solution would be
the most readily implementable. The color coding should be unique and
applied to both the non-fixed and fixed connectors or the area adjacent to the
fixed connector.
2-2. SPACECRAFT BATTERY PROTECTION
The spacecraft battery was not required to deliver more than P 8 amps
steady-state or ; 20 amps transient. However, the 14-cell AgCd, 10 AH battery
could easily deliver 100 amps for a short period of time.
In order to minimize the IR drop from the battery terminals, four
#20 wires were tied in parallell in the harness. In this configuration, a short
circuit in the spacecraft harness from +V b to -V b , signal common, 28V return,
or chassis could cause the spacecraft harness insulation to burn-off with result-
ant damage to other parts of the harness.
Depending on several parameters, some other point in the circuit
may open circuit before significant harness damage occurs. This, however,
is dependent on and varies with the situation.
Z-2-1. Conclusion
The spacecraft battery is unprotected. This is particularly true
when the spacecraft is not powered-up since the level detectors cannot then
function to protect the battery. Even with the spacecraft powered-up, the level
detectors only open the battery switch. This would not necessarily open a
short circuit since the switch is not physically near the battery, but is inside
the System Programmer.
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2-2-2. Recommendation
To protect the spacecraft battery or to protect the spacecraft wiring
harness from the battery, the ability of the battery to deliver current should
be limited. This limiting may take several forms and could also be varied for
"ground operations" versus in-orbit operations.
It is recommended that for ground operations, a fuse or fusible link
(short piece of wire that will fuse at approximately 20 amperes in 50 msec) be
used on future spacecraft. This link would be at the battery terminals. For
launch, the link could remain as is or be jumpered with a wire or switch of
additional current capability. If jumpered with a switch, this could be a
commandable latching relay or a ground-only stimulated relay.
This seems to be a proper area for additional consideration and in-
vestigation. Coupled into this consideration could be the possibility of firing
EED's with capacitors properly sized so that the battery is not essential to
EED firing. Preliminary calculations show that for - 12 amperes and 5 msec,
a capacitor of the order of 3000 pf would be required.
2-3. SPACECRAFT CURRENT
The spacecraft current (ISC) is read out in telemetry every 40. 96
seconds with a resolution of + 35 ma.
2-3-1. Conclusion
There are advantages to having ISC read out more frequently and
with better resolution. For example, some spacecraft functions, when
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commanded, cannot be monitored by ISC since the &ISC is within the established
resolution.
2-3-2. Recommendation
When advanced data systems on the spacecraft are operational, it
would be desirable to read out ISC more frequently in a variable format and
with improved resolution (± 3 ma).
2-4. RF TRANSPARENT DETECTOR COVERS
The IMP H Summary Report, Section 2-5, page 2-3, recommended
that experiment detector covers be RF transparent in order to expose the
experiments to RF rather than protect them from RF.
2-4-1. Conclusion
This recommendation from the IMP H Summary Report was imple-
mented for IMP J. Then RF interference problems were noted and solved
early in the program.
2-4-2. Recommendation
Future spacecraft should be carefully reviewed for the value which
may be obtained by using RF transparent covers instead of covers which
would protect experiments from RF interference.
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2-5. SPACECRAFT CONNECTOR PROTECTION
Some electrical connections to the spacecraft were mated and demated
several times a day. This handling over a period of time can degrade the
spacecraft mounted connector. Specifically, the umbilical and GSE test con-
nectors were exercised regularly. To avoid damage to these connectors,
a short extension, designated Pin Socket Protector (PSP), was attached and
left connected to the spacecraft connector. The make and break connection
was then secured at the non-spacecraft end of this short extension. Thus,
any connector damage would be confined to the PSP.
SPACECRAFT
Demate Here
n Spacecraft
Umbilical Connector
GSE
PSP
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2-5-1. Conclusion
The PSP protection of spacecraft connectors saved some rework
time since it was anticipated that the excessive mating and demating would
have degraded the spacecraft connectors.
2-5-2. Recommendation
For future spacecraft, an evaluation should be made of those areas
where the PSP could effectively be employed. However, occasional testing
without the PSP's should be performed to ensure that the connection without
PSP's works properly.
2-6. DEUTSCH CONNECTORS
Schedule time was lost since Deutsch harness connectors had to be
individually shimmed to maximize pin engagement.
2-6-1. Conclusion
Tolerances on Deutsch connector dimensions were sufficiently loose
that intermittent electrical contact resulted. Since these connectors rely on
the position of the instrument and harness panel to assure full pin engagement,
deviations from the established tolerances can produce intermittent connector
pin contact. The loose tolerances coupled with flexing of honeycomb panels
resulted in commands not being received by the spacecraft during ground
operations.
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2-6-2. Recommendation
The following recommendations are offered to eliminate the prob-
lem:
a. Minimize the use of Deutsch connectors in a "rack and panel"
installation on the spacecraft.
b. Provide better definition of Deutsch connector dimensions and
tolerances in order to maximize pin engagement. Current pin engagement for
Deutsch connectors is approximately 0. 055-inch as compared to 0. 125-inch
for Cannon connectors.
c. Avoid the use of Deutsch connectors where low pin density is
a factor.
2-7. CAPTIVE SCREWS
Schedule time was lost on IMP J searching the spacecraft for screws
dropped during installation of flight plugs. Although no problem was encountered
at ETR, a screw dropped inside the fairing or on the gantry would have caused
loss of time.
2-7-1. Conclusion
Captive screws were not used on all spacecraft components removed
from the spacecraft on the gantry.
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2-7-2. Recommendation
All experiments and instruments must have their removable compo-
nents equipped with captive screws when the cards are delivered for integra-
tion. This includes sensor protective covers and enable and disable plugs.
2-8. SPACECRAFT RF CONFIGURATION
When testing the spacecraft for RF interference either in an anechoic
chamber or in a laboratory, it was difficult to configure the spacecraft suffi-
ciently close to the orbital situation to make the test valid. Although some
areas must be compromised due to lack of experiments or flight solar panels,
etc., other areas can and should be configured more nearly orbital. For
example, removal of solar panel covers, deployment of booms, and instal-
lation of experiment cover panels.
2-8-1. Conclusion
RF interference testing is frequently misleading due to the RF
environment or the spacecraft RF configuration.
2-8-2. Recommendation
Spacecraft configuration and environment should be reviewed more
closely before RF interference tests since these parameters affect the test
results and confuse the test conclusions.
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A scheme for resolving the RF environmental aspect of the problem
was partially implemented at Hangar S of ETR for the IMP J prelaunch opera-
tions. This scheme used an RF detector probe, placed near experiments, to
determine their RF levels when the spacecraft was operational and using flight
antennas. In this manner, the spacecraft could be mapped for direct and re-
flected RF at any point. It is specifically recommended that this idea be further
developed as a tool for determining whether RF interference at an experiment
is real or due to a poor RF environment.
As a starting point, a mapping probe would be designed, developed,
and used with a spacecraft in the optimum environment of an anechoic chamber
to map the spacecraft areas. The spacecraft would then be remapped during
subsequent RF testing in a lab or elsewhere; and this data would be compared
to the anechoic chamber data to determine if the RF interference at an experi-
ment is due to the uncontrolled RF environment.
2-9. OPTICAL ASPECT SYSTEM TESTING
The test set-up and instrumentation for dynamically testing the OA
system ini the spacecraft is insufficient for the task, and has resulted in addi-
tional questions upon test completion. On smaller spacecraft (IMP F and G),
the spacecraft was tested outside in sunlight. With larger spacecraft, this is
not as easily performed.
Areas of responsibility for this test are defined less clearly than for
any other similar spacecraft tests. This relates mostly to test instrumentation
and techniques. A prime problem is that the lamp used to stimulate the OA
sensor may work marginally or not at all. The lamp parameters of intensity,
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spectral purity, collimation, and alignment to the sensor have not been
sufficiently under control for the last several tests.
2-9-1. Conclusion
The test set-up for the dynamic OA system test lacks a proper
and controlled stimulating light source.
2-9-2. Recommendation
For subsequent spacecraft OA system tests, the stimulating lamp
should be improved as related to the spectral output, intensity, collimation,
and alignment of the lamp to the spacecraft sensor. Either T&E or the OA
Instrumenter should be responsible for this test equipment, but not both.
2-10. OPTICAL ASPECT SYSTEM GEOMETRY
On both IMP H and IMP J there was confusion up until launch
regarding the geometric relationship between the Optical Aspect sun slit
and earthtelescope. In order to determine the earth telescope line-of-site
relative to the spin axis and sun slit, certain rough measurements were made
on both IMP H and J spacecraft at ETR.
2-10-1. Conclusion
The geometry associated with the Optical Aspect system was not
understood completely by anyone except the OA Instrumenter.
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2-10-2. Recommendation
At the start of spacecraft design, a review should be held during
which all requirements for attitude sensing equipment is discussed in detail.
If the line-of-site of sun and earth sensors is quite critical, then a special
rigid structure should be provided for that system. In addition, the instru-
menter should write a test procedure for determining these LOS, and he should
provide the associated GSE.
2-11. PROJECT DRAWINGS
On both the IMP H and IMP J spacecraft, the spacecraft umbilical
connector was keyed 1800 differently than the mating connector on the fairing
provided by MDAC. Consequently, the fairing connector and pigtail had to
be rotated to mate with the spacecraft. This caused unnecessary stress on
the wiring.
2-11-1. Conclusion
The Delta Interface Document generated by the spacecraft personnel
and the Compatibility Drawing generated by the Launch Vehicle Contractor
were not thorough concerning all details.
2-11-2. Recommendation
The Project Office should review these documents for details, such
as connector keying and lanyard material, length, and positioning.
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2-12. SUBSYSTEM FIT CHECKS
On several occasions during the IMP H and J program, an existing
problem was discovered just prior to starting a certain operation or test.
Some of these problems were physical interference, cable routing, lack of
material, wrong size material, etc. As a result, either schedule time was
lost or the test configuration was compromised.
2-12-1. Conclusion
In the interest of meeting production and test schedules, full fit
checks of certain subsystems were compromised. Included in this category
were: 1) fully configured experiment booms, and 2) fully configured kick motor,
including thermal blankets.
2-12-2. Recommendation
A formal fit check must be required and witnessed by the Project
Office with photographic coverage. These photos will help to answer subse-
quent questions, and the fit checks will assure that tests may start on schedule.
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SECTION III
INTEGRATION PROBLEMS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following problems were encountered during integration and are
noted here because they are potential problem areas on future spacecraft.
3-1. DELIVERY OF COMPONENTS
To integrate a spacecraft, a prescribed order is followed: a) struc-
ture, b) harness, c) power system, d) telemetry system. After this point,
any of several paths may be chosen. During integration of IMP J, sometimes
components were not available and compromise paths of integration were taken.
For example, several components of the power system were integrated, but
they were not intended for flight or as spares.
3-1-1. Conclusion
Deviations from a planned order of integration create difficulties
regarding uncompleted tests and procedures.
3-1-2. Recommendation
Scheduling of instruments should be more closely related to the order
of integration. Compromise routes should be avoided since they introduce risk
to the spacecraft.
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3-2. INSTRUMENTATION TECHNIQUES
This is an area where several problems were avoided and is mentioned
here so that these techniques may continue to be used on future spacecraft.
Instrumenting to a component or the spacecraft harness was performed
to virtually eliminate an accidental short circuit. For example, oscilloscopes
were always grounded through the power cord, and the oscilloscope chassis
was always insulated from the spacecraft. A one-to-one scope probe was used,
but it had a built-in 1 k-ohm resistor in series. Thus, an accidental short of
the cable at the oscilloscope end would be through 1 k-ohm and, in most cases,
it would cause no damage.
Oscilloscope measurements were made without referencing the oscil-
loscope to spacecraft signal common. The oscilloscope was only referenced
through its power cord, and ultimately to spacecraft signal common. This
technique can avoid many possible short circuit problems.
3-2-1. Conclusion
Instrumentation techniques employed on IMP J avoided damage to
the spacecraft through accidental shorts, etc. This indicates that good
techniques will prevent problems.
3-2-2. Recommendation
Instrumentation techniques on the spacecraft should be continuously
reviewed and updated from the point of view of protecting spacecraft systems.
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3-3. DEFECTS IN DELIVERED COMPONENTS
Components delivered for inspection and integration frequently do
not pass the incoming inspection. When this occurs, a Discrepancy Report
is written and the component returned to the Instrumenter or Experimenter
for repair or modification.
3-3-1. Conclusion
Delivered items which do not pass inspection cause schedule delays
and generate additional paperwork.
3-3-2. Recommendation
A careful visual inspection of components at GSFC prior to delivery
to EMR for Receiving Inspection could reduce rejections by as much as 50
percent. Thus, it is recommended that components be submitted to a thorough
visual inspection by GSFC QC prior to delivery.
3-4. APPROVED MATERIALS
The integration team continually monitored the spacecraft vicinity
for unapproved materials which might be harmful to solid state detectors.
In addition, the materials used on the spacecraft had to be screened and
approved.
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3-4-1. Conclusion
Interfacing organizations were not always apprised of the importance
of the Approved Materials List. This includes Experimenters and the Vehicle
Contractor.
3-4-2. Recommendation
a. Integration personnel must continue to coordinate with the GSFC
Materials personnel and periodically update the Approved Materials List.
b. An updated copy of the Approved Materials List must be avail-
able to the Test Conductor.
c. The Approved Materials List should be distributed to all inter-
facing organizations on a periodic basis.
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SECTION IV
ENVIRONMENTAL TEST PROBLEMS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following problems were encountered during the Test and Evalu-
ation (T&E) phase at GSFC and are noted here because they are potential
problem areas on future spacecraft.
4-1. THERMAL VACUUM TEST VS. HIGH VOLTAGE
During the Thermal Vacuum Tests, the possibility of high voltage
discharge from an experiment is always present. Several precautions must
be taken to minimize this possibility.
a. Have a detailed Design Review of the experiment high voltage
design with particular attention to packaging techniques,
b. Provide a clean vacuum chamber (relatively free from out-
gassing),
c. Provide a clean spacecraft (relatively free from outgassing),
d. Establish a sufficient time-pressure factor before high voltage
-6
turn-on (i.e., 10 hours at 1 x 10 torr or less before turn-on).
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4-1-1. Conclusion
To avoid a high voltage discharge problem in thermal vacuum, the
previous precautions must be followed. The vacuum chamber cleanliness,
spacecraft cleanliness, and time-pressure factor are presently recognized
and agreed upon principles which have been applied to IMP J with success.
The remaining item is a high voltage design review with particular
attention to packaging techniques, and it requires greater discussion. The
high voltage design review of experiments should be held separate from the
general review and should be conducted by a GSFC high voltage packaging
expert. This review should be held early, i.e., before significant packaging
design has been performed. It would be most desirable to have examples of
high voltage power supplies available for display at this design review. Having
a list of materials and examples would also be of value. Displaying an X-ray
of a hollow core resistor and an X-ray of a resistor without a hollow core,
along with cut-open examples of each resistor type, could be valuable.
4-1-2. Recommendation
Although IMP J experienced no high voltage problems in thermal
vacuum, careful consideration of the previous precautions is recommended
for future spacecraft. A definite trend of less and less high voltage problems
has been established when IMP F, G, I, H, and J are considered, with IMP J
having had no high voltage problems during the thermal vacuum testing.
The high voltage design review should be held separate from the
general design review and should include those persons who are associated
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with high voltage design and packaging problems. Since it may be advisable
to have this review organized and conducted by a GSFC high voltage expert,
this is being recommended. The high voltage review should display physical
examples of good and bad component selection and packaging techniques.
Even with the considerable effort being applied toward solving the
high voltage vs. thermal vacuum test problems, many packaging designs seem
oblivious to the prior history of problems. There is much information in
existance concerning these high voltage problems. However, one of the
reasons that all this data seems to be ignored is that it is not compiled into
a more comprehensive form. It is recommended that such data be compiled
into a guide book and be made available to designers.
Precautions b, c, and d listed at the beginning of this section, and
requiring a clean vacuum chamber, a clean spacecraft, and a sufficient time-
pressure factor, have been implemented for IMP J. However, continued
attention should be paid to these areas. It is recommended that the vacuum
chamber be "baked out" prior to installing the spacecraft for a thermal vacuum
test. Two choices are available for this "bake out". One choice is to use the
same temperature cycle for the empty vacuum chamber as the first cycle will
be for the spacecraft (see Figure 1). An advantage of this cycle is that the
pressures encountered with the chamber empty can then be correlated to the
Zo 
+40C
-200C
I Empty Chamber
1--Bake Out Cycle -
Figure 1. Vacuum Chamber Temperature Cycle
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pressures with the chamber containing the spacecraft. This result could give
an indication of spacecraft outgassing. The other choice is to "bake out" the
empty vacuum chamber at as high a temperature as practicable and for as
long as reasonable (24 hours to 48 hours).
A clean spacecraft can be obtained if certain items are properly
handled. Basically, the spacecraft will be clean in some respects due to
the cleanliness restraints. However, materials which will outgas under
vacuum are not easily removed except by a vacuum exposure. It is assumed
that this exposure removes most materials which could outgas since each
component has undergone a thermal vacuum test. Some parts of the struc-
ture have not been exposed to vacuum and are the most probable contri-
butors to a larg gas load. Specifically, any honeycomb structure parts are
potential outgassing areas. This would be -- main platform, harness support
panels, dummy solar panels, and the live solar panels. The gas load from
such honeycomb structure is unknown. It appears that the dummy solar
panels outgas heavily during thermal vacuum testing. Due to this suspicion,
the panels were "baked out" in a vacuum chamber prior to a spacecraft ther-
mal vacuum test. Subsequently, it appeared that the spacecraft gas load was
less. The relative cleanliness of such a structure could be determined by a
special test on a sample piece and this is recommended. If it is determined
that the honeycombed structure is a large contributor to outgassing, then all
honeycombed pieces should be thermal vacuum exposed prior to installation
on the spacecraft.
In addition to having a clean spacecraft, it is desirable to first
expose the spacecraft to a hot temperature instead of a cold temperature.
The hot exposure should be performed with the spacecraft experiments off.
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The exposure temperature should be ; +400C for at least Z4 hours. This
will provide the spacecraft with an opportunity to outgas. If the empty
chamber had been operated previously at this temperature (outgassed),
then a comparison of the pressure vs. time curves for the chamber with
and without the spacecraft would indicate the relative cleanliness of the
spacecraft.
For IMP J, a single thermal vacuum test was performed by using
the hot non-operating exposure first. No high voltage problems occurred.
Therefore, it seems fair to attribute some of this success to the thermal
vacuum operating modes.
A sufficient time-pressure factor in a vacuum chamber before high
voltage turn-on has already been implemented for IMP J. The procedures
call out exactly how many hours are required at a certain vacuum before high
voltage turn-on. This factor was used on IMP J and no high voltage problems
occurred.
4-Z. SUBSYSTEM TESTING AT T&E
The subsystem (component) testing at T&E is conducted by a GSFC
Test Conductor working with the Experimenter or Instrumenter. During this
testing, there are situations where the Test Conductor should exercise his
authority to stop the test, or contact the Project Office, or write a Malfunc-
tion Report (MR). Several areas have been noted where this authority has
not been exercised. This in turn affects mission success.
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During subsystem testing (as in spacecraft system testing), a correct
positive action must occur at the proper time. If this correct action is not
taken, the opportunity is lost since the action cannot be taken while the test
is still in process. The problem, malfunction, or failure is then published
weeks or months later in a test report. When the test data become available,
the subsystem may already have been integrated into the spacecraft. At this
time, a decision to reperform the subsystem test is severely limited by cost
and schedule.
4-2-1. Conclusion
Correct action must be taken by the Test Conductor when problems
occur during subsystem testing. Since the failure of the test is not known until
the Test Conductor's report is published, a delay occurs. This is usually too
late in the program.
4-2-2. Recommendation
The GSFC Test Conductors must be made aware of their authority
to stop a test, to contact the Project Office, to write an MR, or to do all of
these things. When a problem is noted, the Test Conductors may recommend
that the Experimenter or the Project Office write an MR. If this does not
occur, the Test Conductor should write the MR.
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4-3. STORAGE BATTERIES (CELLS) USED WITH GROUND SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT
For several test applications GSE incorporated the use of storage
batteries. This includes lead-acid and carbon-zinc types.
All of these batteries have a massive capability of delivering energy.
In particular, an automotive lead-acid battery can easily deliver 500 amperes
for a short period. There is no need for such a capability near a spacecraft
or personnel.
4-3-1. Conclusion
The hazard of storage batteries used in GSE has not been fully recog-
nized. Several incidents with such batteries involving IMP J have been previously
reported.
4-3-2. Recommendation
All GSE storage batteries or cells should be limited in their capability
coul joules joules
to deliver energy. Consider 500 coul at 12 -*6000sec coul sec
The limiting of capability should be in the form of a properly sized
fuse or a fusable link. This protection shall be as close to the output termi-
nals of the battery as practicable in order that a short circuit before the fuse
be minimized.
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SECTION V
PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS PROBLEMS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following operation problems which occurred should be avoided
in future spacecraft or launch operations.
a. The Long Functional Test at ETR was originally scheduled as
five 10-hour days. Although the test was completed in five days, the time
periods were considerably longer than 10 hours. This was due to the per-
formance of many unplanned tests, which required additional time. On subse-
quent operations, the plan should be reviewed more closely and the time
required should be estimated more realistically.
b. It would be desirable to take an Analog Tape Recorder to the
launch site so that spacecraft data may be sent to GSFC for test purposes
without the necessity of turning on the spacecraft. This was implemented for
IMP J.
c. The continuity of data lines from ETR to GSFC were a problem
at times. The lines were frequently disconnected when not in use, then they
were not available when needed again. This could be avoided by personnel
attaching tape to the connections and marking the use of the cable.
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